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Preface  
 
I chose to write on the use of force by United Nations and the principle of 
sovereignty, because of massacres committed in Rwanda, mass violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law happened during Liberia civil conflict; 
and crimes committed against displaced people in “Daien” in 1986 and civil 
war from 1983-2005 in the Sudan. The Security Council did not take any 
enforcement action to stop any of the above crimes. It is the responsibility of 
the United Nations to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. 
One notices double standard measures of the United Nations and European 
community in dealing with Africa crisis and what happened in former 
Yugoslavia in Bosnia and Kosovo.  
In this thesis I focused mainly on the Charter of the United Nations, 
Chapters I, II, V, and VII, and compared it with the League of Nations and 
Security Council resolutions. The Security Council has very wide power to 
determine the situation, whether inter-state conflict or civil war, if it is a 
threat to the peace or breach of peace and decide what proper measures it 
can administer to preserve international peace and security.  
The thesis deals with the power of the UN to intervene in domestic matters 
of the members states as an exception to general principle of non-
intervention.  
The exception is in application of enforcement measures under Charter VII. 
It is divided into four chapters. Chapter One is about intervention by the UN 
in the case of aggression. Chapter Two deals with humanitarian intervention. 
Chapter Three discusses peacekeeping, and Chapter Four sums up 
conclusions and makes recommendations.        
 XII
ABSTRACT  
The subject of this thesis is the Use of Force by the United Nations and the 
Principle of Sovereignty. It discusses the intervention by UN in domestic 
matters of member states as an exception to the general principle of non-
intervention by the UN in domestic matters of member states. The exception 
is in the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. The power 
of the Security Council under Chapter VII is very wide power unlike that of 
the Council of the League of Nations. The Security Council has power to 
determine the situation whether there is a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace or act of aggression. It can make recommendations or take non-
military or military enforcement measures which are binding on all member 
states.  
Also discussed are the bases for humanitarian intervention, namely, to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to promote and respect 
human rights without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. I tried 
to enumerate the crimes which allow the UN to intervene for protection of 
human rights and humanitarian law, like crime of genocide; crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. These crimes are considered by Security Council 
as threats to international peace and security.  
Attention is then turn to the peacekeeping force. There are two kinds of 
military units, observer groups and peacekeeping forces. Their main function 
is to facilitate and prevent a resurgence of hostilities. According to 
traditional theory the main principles of peacekeeping forces are consent, 
impartiality and use of force only in self-defence. However, 
contemporaneous peacekeeping theories are protection of humanitarian 
operations during warfare, protecting civilian populations in safe areas, 
 XIII
maintaining civil law and order, establishing local police forces; and 
pressing the parties to achieve national reconciliation at a pace faster than 
they were ready to accept. The relations between the United Nations and 
contributing states has to be regulated by an agreement. The sovereignty of 
the host state is to be respected.  
Finally, it is recommended that there should be UN standing army. This 
should include enforcement forces whose basic function is to respond to any 
threat to peace, breach of international peace or acts of aggression. The use 
of the enforcement forces should be under Chapter VII only and there is no 
need for the consent of the targetted state. Peacekeeping forces can only be 
established when there is a peace agreement.  
VIX 
   اﻟﺒﺤﺚﻣﻠﺨﺺ
ﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺙ ﻤﻭﻀﻭﻉ ﺍﺴﺘﺨﺩﺍﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺓ ﺒﻭﺍﺴﻁﺔ ﺍﻷﻤﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺩﺓ ﻭﻤﺒﺩﺃ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﻭﻁﻨﻴﺔ، 
ﻭﻗﺩ ﻨﺎﻗﺵ ﺘﺩﺨل ﺍﻷﻤﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺩﺓ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻷﻤﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﺍﺨﻠﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺩﻭل ﺍﻷﻋﻀﺎﺀ ﻜﺎﺴـﺘﺜﻨﺎﺀ ﻟﻠﻤﺒـﺩﺃ 
ﻟﻘﺩ . ﺍﻷﺴﺎﺴﻲ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻴﻤﻨﻊ ﺍﻷﻤﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺩﺓ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﺩﺨل ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺸﺌﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﺍﺨﻠﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺩﻭل ﺍﻷﻋﻀﺎﺀ 
. ﺍﻻﺴﺘﺜﻨﺎﺀ ﻓﻲ ﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻁﻠﺏ ﺒﺎﺴﺘﺨﺩﺍﻡ ﺍﻟﻔﺼل ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺒﻊ ﻤﻥ ﻤﻴﺜﺎﻕ ﺍﻷﻤﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤـﺩﺓ ﻭﺭﺩ ﻫﺫﺍ 
ﻓﻠﻤﺠﻠﺱ ﺍﻷﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﺴﻠﻁﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﺴﻌﺔ ﺤﺴﺏ ﺍﻟﻔﺼل ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺒﻊ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﻴﺜﺎﻕ ﻭﻫﺫﺍ ﺒﺨـﻼﻑ 
 ﻋﻤـﺎ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻓﻠﻤﺠﻠﺱ ﺍﻷﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﺴﻠﻁﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﺴﻌﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺘﺤﺩﻴﺩ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻟﺔ . ﻤﺠﻠﺱ ﻋﺼﺒﺔ ﺍﻷﻤﻡ 
ﺃﻭ ﻭﻗﻭﻉ ﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻋﺘﺩﺍﺀ، ﻭﻴﺴﺘﻁﻴﻊ ﻤﺠﻠـﺱ ﻜﺎﻥ ﻫﻨﺎﻙ ﺘﻬﺩﻴﺩ ﻟﻠﺴﻠﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻹﺨﻼل ﺒﻪ 
ﺍﻷﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﺒﻌﺩ ﺘﻘﻴﻴﻡ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﺇﺼﺩﺍﺭ ﺘﻭﺼﻴﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﺘﺨﺎﺫ ﺘﺩﺍﺒﻴﺭ ﻭﻗﺘﻴﺔ ﺃﻭ ﺇﺠﺭﺍﺀﺍﺕ ﻏﻴـﺭ 
  . ﻋﺴﻜﺭﻴﺔ ﺃﻭ ﻋﺴﻜﺭﻴﺔ ﻤﻠﺯﻤﺔ ﻟﻠﺩﻭل ﺍﻷﻋﻀﺎﺀ
ﺃﻴﻀﺎﹰ ﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺙ ﺩﻭﺍﻋﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﺩﺨل ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻨﻲ ﺒﻐﺭﺽ ﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺍﻷﺠﻴﺎل ﺍﻟﺒﺸﺭﻴﺔ ﻤﻥ ﻭﻴﻼﺕ 
ﻨﺴﺎﻥ ﺩﻭﻥ ﺘﻤﻴﻴﺯ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﺴﺎﺱ ﺍﻟﺠﻨﺱ ﻭﺍﻟﻨﻭﻉ ﻭﺍﻟﻠﻐـﺔ ﺍﻟﺤﺭﺏ ﻭﻟﺘﺭﻗﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﺤﺘﺭﺍﻡ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻹ 
ﻭﻗﺩ ﺤﺎﻭﻟﺕ ﺘﺤﺩﻴﺩ ﺍﻟﺠﺭﺍﺌﻡ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﺒﻴﺢ ﻟﻸﻤﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺘﺩﺨل ﻟﺤﻤﺎﻴـﺔ ﺤﻘـﻭﻕ . ﻭﺍﻟﺩﻴﺎﻨﺔ
ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻨﻲ، ﻜﺠﺭﺍﺌﻡ ﺍﻹﺒﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺠﺭﺍﺌﻡ ﻀﺩ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻨﻴﺔ ﻭﺠـﺭﺍﺌﻡ 
  . ﻠﺴﻠﻡ ﻭﺍﻷﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﻴﻥﻭﻗﺩ ﺍﻋﺘﺒﺭ ﻤﺠﻠﺱ ﺍﻷﻤﻥ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺠﺭﺍﺌﻡ ﺘﺸﻜل ﺘﻬﺩﻴﺩﺍﹰ ﻟ. ﺍﻟﺤﺭﺏ
ﻭﺃﻴﻀﺎﹰ ﺍﺘﺠﻪ ﺍﻻﻫﺘﻤﺎﻡ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻗﻭﺍﺕ ﺤﻔﻅ ﺍﻟﺴﻼﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻭﻫﻲ ﺘﻨﻘﺴﻡ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻗﺴﻤﻴﻥ؛ ﻤﺠﻤﻭﻋﺔ 
. ﺍﻟﻤﺭﺍﻗﺒﺔ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻭﻗﻭﺍﺕ ﺤﻔﻅ ﺍﻟﺴﻠﻡ، ﻭﻤﻥ ﻭﻅﺎﺌﻔﻬﺎ ﻭﻤﻬﺎﻤﻬﺎ ﻤﻨـﻊ ﺘﻁـﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﻌـﺩﺍﻭﺍﺕ 
ﻭﺤﺴﺏ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺭﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺩﻴﺔ ﻓﻬﻲ ﺘﻘﻭﻡ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻤﺒﺩﺃ ﺍﻟﻘﺒﻭل ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﻤﻭﺍﻓﻘﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺤﻴﺎﺩ ﻭﻋﺩﻡ ﺍﺴﺘﺨﺩﻡ 
ﻭﺓ ﺇﻻ ﻓﻲ ﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﺱ، ﺃﻤﺎ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺭﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺎﺼﺭﺓ ﻓﻘﺩ ﺤﺩﺩﺕ ﻤﻬﺎﻡ ﻭﻭﻅﺎﺌﻑ ﺍﻟﻘ
ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻨﻴﺔ ﺃﺜﻨﺎﺀ ﺍﻻﺸﺘﺒﺎﻜﺎﺕ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﻘﺘﺎل، ﻭﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤـﺩﻨﻴﻴﻥ 
ﻓﻲ ﺍﻷﻤﺎﻜﻥ ﺍﻵﻤﻨﺔ ﻭﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﻭﺍﻟﻘـﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﻭﻤﻤﺎﺭﺴـﺔ ﺍﻟـﻀﻐﻭﻁ ﻋﻠـﻰ ﺍﻷﻁـﺭﺍﻑ 
  . ﻟﻭﺼﻭل ﺇﻟﻰ ﺘﺴﻭﻴﺔ ﺴﺭﻴﻌﺔﺍﻟﻤﺘﻨﺎﺯﻋﺔ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺎﺭﺒﺔ ﻤﻥ ﺃﺠل ﺍ
VX 
ﺇﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺒﻴﻥ ﺍﻷﻤﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺩﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﺩﻭل ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭﻜﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻭﺍﺕ ﺤﻔﻅ ﺍﻟﺴﻼﻡ ﻻ ﺒﺩ ﺃﻥ ﻴﻨﻅﻤﻬﺎ 
، ﻭﻴﻨﺒﻐﻲ 5491 ﻤﻥ ﻤﻴﺜﺎﻕ ﺍﻷﻤﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺩﺓ ﻟﺴﻨﺔ 34ﺍﺘﻔﺎﻕ ﺒﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻭﺫﻟﻙ ﺤﺴﺏ ﻨﺹ ﺍﻟﻤﺎﺩﺓ 
  . ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻻﺘﻔﺎﻕ ﻤﺭﺍﻋﺎﺓ ﺴﻴﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﻀﻴﻔﺔ
ﻭﻫـﺫﻩ . ﺄﻥ ﺘﻜﻭﻥ ﻟﻸﻤﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺩﺓ ﻗﻭﺍﺕ ﻋﺴﻜﺭﻴﺔ ﺩﺍﺌﻤﺔ ﻭﺃﺨﻴﺭﺍﹰ ﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺙ ﺍﻟﺘﻭﺼﻴﺎﺕ ﺒ 
 ﻗﻭﺍﺕ ﺘﺩﺨل ﻋﺴﻜﺭﻱ ﻭﻴﻜﻭﻥ ﻤﻬﺎﻤﻬﺎ ﺍﻷﺴﺎﺴـﻲ ﺍﻟﺘـﺼﺩﻱ ﻷﻱ :ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﺕ ﺘﺘﻀﻤﻥ ﺃﻭﻻﹰ 
ﺘﻬﺩﻴﺩ ﻟﻠﺴﻠﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻹﺨﻼل ﺒﻪ ﺃﻭ ﻭﻗﻭﻉ ﺃﻱ ﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻋﺘﺩﺍﺀ، ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺘﻜﻭﻥ ﺍﺴـﺘﺨﺩﺍﻡ 
. ﻓﺔ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﻤﺨﻠﺔ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﺕ ﺘﺤﺕ ﺍﻟﻔﺼل ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺒﻊ ﻓﻘﻁ ﺩﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﺠﺔ ﻟﻤﻭﺍﻓﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﻬﺩ 
ﻗﻭﺍﺕ ﺤﻔﻅ ﺍﻟﺴﻼﻡ ﻴﻤﻜﻥ ﺍﻻﺴﺘﻌﺎﻨﺔ ﺒﻬﺎ ﻓﻘﻁ ﻓﻲ ﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﺘﻭﻗﻴﻊ ﺍﻷﻁﺭﺍﻑ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻨﺎﺯﻋـﺔ : ﺜﺎﻨﻴﺎﹰ
   .  ﻻﺘﻔﺎﻗﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﻼﻡ
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CHAPTER ONE 
Intervention by the UN in the Case of Aggression 
 
1- Introduction   
(i) The Use of Force among the Nations  
The use of force among nations is an ancient principle. During the Roman 
era the principle was that power creates right and protect it. The right to 
conquer was permissible until 1919, when the League of Nations was 
drawn up; its provision took the form of procedural constraint on resort to 
war. In Articles 11 to 17, resort to war was permissible1. There was an 
obligation by members to respect and preserve as against external 
aggression, the territorial integrity and existing independence of all 
members of the League2. Also, recommendation made by American 
States at Washington in 1890 contained the principle that cessions of 
territory made under threats of war or in the presence of an armed force 
should be void. The Sixth Assembly of the League of Nations adopted a 
resolution on 25 September 1925 which stated that a war of aggression 
constitutes an international crime. At the Eighth Assembly the League 
prohibited war of aggression. The League system of collective security 
was based on the legal commitment of each member state to apply 
sweeping economic and financial sanctions against the aggression3. So, 
the League of Nations strove hard to check the out break of hostilities 
among nations. Economic and military sanctions were to be taken if a 
state had gone to war in violation of the Covenant, but the sanctions 
mechanism was based largely on the willingness of the member states to 
                                           
1 League of Nations Covenant 1919.   
2 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. Oxford University Press 2003, p. 698.  
3 Barros, The United Nations: Past Present, and Future, The Free Press, New York, 1972, p. 16. 
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take action. The Council of the League could issue recommendations for 
the enforcement of military sanctions. Moreover, in the event of war or 
threat of war, the League could under Article 11 take any action that may 
be deemed wise and effectual to safe guard the peace of nations. This was 
regarded as an authorization to use force4. In the case of Italy and 
Ethiopia, the League imposed sanctions against Italy in the years 1935-
1936 and they were adopted individually.  
However, the Council of the League did not possess the power to 
determine whether situation of threat to the peace of nations exist.  
(ii) The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War 1928  
The treaty contains general principles for the renunciation to war. Article 
1 condemns recourse to war for the solution of international 
controversies. This treaty is still in force and was applied during the 
Nuremberg war crimes tribunal.  
2- Non Intervention by UN in Domestic Matters of Member State 
Article 2 (7) of UN Charter stipulates that nothing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in any 
state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement 
under the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Charter VII5. The basic 
principle is the prohibition of the use of force by the United Nations in 
domestic matters of every state. The phrase "domestic jurisdiction" in the 
article is to protect the sovereignty of the member states. The declaration 
of the sovereignty is set by the General Assembly in its Declaration on 
Friendly Relations among states 1970. According to that Declaration all 
                                           
4 Bruno Simma, The Charter of United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed. vol. 1, Oxford University Press 
2002, p. 702. 
5 The Charter of the United Nations 1940.  
 3
states enjoy the rights that are inherent in full sovereignty, and each state 
has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic 
and cultural system6.  
Accordingly Article 2 (7) protects only against acts of the United Nations 
and not against acts of other states. Matters essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction which are not, in principle, regulated by 
international law. That was decided in the case of the Nationality Decrees 
in Tunis and Morocco in 1923 by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice.  
3- Exceptions to the Principle of Non-Intervention by the UN in 
Domestic Matters of Member States 
(i) Enforcement Measures under Chapter VII  
Enforcement measures under Chapter VII is not subject to the plea of 
domestic jurisdiction. But mere recommendation by Security Council 
under Article 39 remains subject to the general domestic jurisdiction rule. 
Enforcement measures are not limited to military enforcement measures. 
While the term enforcement measure in Article 53 of the Charter of the 
UN is understood to exclude non-military sanctions, I can say the term 
'enforcement measures' under Article 2 (7) includes all binding decisions 
which the Security Council makes under Chapter VII . 
The purpose of the exception under Article 2 (7) is to set the Security 
Council activity under Chapter VII free from domestic jurisdiction.  
This purpose will not be achieved if the determination of the situation, 
whether it is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression 
were subject to the general domestic jurisdiction7.       
                                           
6 General Assembly Resolution, 2625 (xxv), October 24. 1970.  
7 Bruno Simma, Supra note 4, at 170.   
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However, some states objected that sanctions should not become method 
of intervening in affairs that fall essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of states8.  
Others have declared that humanitarian crises should not be used as 
pretexts for invoking Chapter VII measures9. Today states rarely allege 
that the principles of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction provide a 
shield for systematic violations of human rights. Also, self-determination 
can not be considered a domestic jurisdiction because it is linked to 
human rights and Article 1 (2) of the Charter of the UN uphold that.       
(ii) Domestic Matters  
The relevant question is who will raise whether certain matters fall within 
the domestic jurisdiction. Article 15 (8) of the League Covenant 
attributed the power to decide whether a matter fell within the domestic 
jurisdiction to League Council and thereby took it away from individual 
states10.  Similarly, the United Nations Organs have power to make a 
prima facie assessment of the applicability of a particular norm without. 
However, formally having a determinative say11.  
To sum up, Article 2 (7) was intended to strengthen the protection of 
states sovereignty against incursions into their domestic affairs. But it 
cannot be a plea against enforcement measures under Chapter VII, i.e. 
action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts 
of aggression. It enables the Security Council to tackle the roots of a 
conflict before it reaches dimensions which are harder or impossible to 
manage.  
 
                                           
8 GAOR A/53/PV, 40. October 21. 1998, p. 21 (Costa Rica).   
9 GAOR A/53/PV, 40. October 21. 1998, p. 24 (China).   
10 League of Nations Covenant 1919.   
11 Bruno Simma, Supra note 4, at p. 171.   
 5
4- Powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII    
(i) Historical Background  
By virtue of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Security Council enjoys greater power than any other international organ 
in history. The decision to grant the Security Council such broad powers 
was mainly a reaction to the unsatisfactory with system of sanctions in 
the framework of the League. Economic and military sanctions were to be 
taken if a state had gone to war in violation of the Covenant, which, 
however, did not include a general prohibition on the use of force. The 
application of sanctions depends on the willingness of the member states 
to take action. Article 11, Para I , of the League Covenant stipulated that, 
in the event of war or threat of war the League should "take any action 
that may be deemed wise  and effectual to safeguard the peace of 
nations".  
(ii) The Power to Maintain International Peace and Security  
The failure of the League of Nations led to creation of an Organization 
with strong coercive power, able to counter threats of war immediately. 
So, the Security Council was established with far-reaching powers under 
Chapter VII of the Charter and subjected to very few express limitations. 
The Security Council has power  to determine the existence of a threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression; it can make 
recommendation, order provisional measures, or take non-military or 
military enforcement measures according to the exigencies of the 
particular situation. These measures are binding on member states if the 
Security Council so decides.  
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The freedom as the addressee of the measures rest upon the assumption 
that the Security Council acts merely as police man and no as a jury12. 
The Security Council does not have to wait until there is a determination 
of who is right and who is wrong, but its task is to stop the fighting or to 
remove the threat to the peace as soon as possible. Although, the General 
Assembly can discuss matters relating to peace and security and at a upon 
them, it cannot make any recommendation in situations calling for action 
i.e. enforcement action under Chapter VII “Art. 11 (2)”. Moreover, 
Article 12 (1) of the Charter precludes General Assembly 
recommendations on a specific situation while the Security Council is 
exercising its function in this respect.  
Thus, the Security Council, has established itself as a law-enforcement 
organ of the international community in the area of peace and security, 
for example in the Resolutions 687, 692, 707 the Security Council took 
action specifically to ensure compliance with the duties under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and with the obligation to make reparation for the 
damage caused13.  
In the case of Haiti, it found a threat to the peace in the failure of the 
military authorities to fulfill their obligations under the Governors Island 
Agreement14.  
In the case of Bosnia, it authorized military action to ensure compliance 
with the peace agreement. In the Angola conflict, the Security Council 
held the rebel movement (UNITA) responsible for violations of peace 
accord and imposed economic sanctions against it15.          
                                           
12 Bruno Simma, Supra note 4, p. 705.  
13 SC. Res. 687, April 03.1991. SC. Res. 692, May 20.1991. SC. Res. 707, August 15.1991.  
14 SC. Res. 917, May 6.1994.  
15 SC. Res. 1127, August 27.1997. SC. Res. 1237, May 07.1999. 
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In the war in the Congo, the Security Council found Rwanda and Uganda 
in violation of the territorial integrity of the Congo and thus demanded 
their withdrawal16. 
Besides its function as law enforcement, the Security Council has quasi-
judicial function. It has had to determine the violation of a norm. It has 
also quasi-legislative functions, and it can regulate state behavior 
worldwide and for extended periods of time, for example, in case of Iraq, 
the former Yugoslavia or Sierra Leone, embargoes on certain products, 
services and actions were in force over years.  
The Security Council in recent years begun to authorize the 
administration of territory as an enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII, for example, the administrations established in 1999 for Kosovo and 
East Timor took on a much comprehensive form.  
5-The Determination of Situation  
Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations allows the Security 
Council broad powers to determine whether a threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace or an act of aggression exists. According to Articles 1 (1) 
and 24 of the Charter, the primary responsibilities of the Security Council 
are restricted to the maintenance of international peace and security17.       
A breach of the peace is characterized by hostilities between armed units 
of two states. Moreover, internal armed conflict can constitute breach of 
peace once it is accepted that these might pose threats to the peace. Threat 
to the peace can be considered as an impeding armed conflict, and also 
ongoing conflicts represent threat to the peace, e.g. continued fighting 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea18.  
                                           
16 SC. Res. 1304, June 16.2000. 
17 The Charter of the United Nations 1945.  
18 SC. Res. 1298, May 17.2000.  
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6- Acts of Aggression  
(i) Definition of Aggression  
The Charter of the United Nations did not define the term aggression. But 
the General Assembly in its Resolution, 3314 (XXIX) December 
14,1974, defined aggression as follows: Article (1)19 stipulates that 
aggression is the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in 
this definition. The term state in this article is used without prejudice to 
questions of recognition or whether a state is a member of the United 
Nations. Also, it includes the concept of a “group of states” where 
appropriate.  
(ii) Acts Considered as Aggression  
The following acts are considered to constitute an act of aggression: 
• The first use of armed force by state constitutes prima facie 
evidence of an act of aggression,  
• The invasion or attack by armed forces of a state of the territory or 
another state, or any military occupation, however, temporary, 
resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the 
use of force of the territory of another state or part thereof,  
• Bombardment by the armed forces of a state against the territory of 
another state,  
• The blockade of the ports or coasts of a state by the armed forces 
of another state,  
                                           
19 GA. Res. 3314 (XXIX) December 14.1974.   
 9
• An attack by the armed forces of a state on the land, sea, or air 
forces, or marine and air fleets of another state,  
• The use of armed forces of one state which are within the territory 
of another state with the agreement of the receiving state, in 
contravention of the conditions provided for in such territory 
beyond the termination of the agreement,  
• The action of a state in allowing its territory which it has placed at 
the disposal of another state, to be used by that other state for 
perpetrating an act of aggression against third state,  
• The sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force 
against another state of such gravity, or its substantial involvement 
therein,  
• Any other acts which the Security Council may determine that 
constitute aggression.  
7- The Situations Endangering the Maintenance of International 
Peace and Security 
(i) Civil War  
Although Article 39 refers mainly to threats of inter-state conflicts, the 
Security Council throughout its practice abandoned such approach. For 
example, in the Indonesia conflict, civil war was considered as a threat to 
the peace. Again, in Resolution 733 of January 23,1992, the Security 
Council considered the fighting between different factions within Somalia 
constituted a threat to international peace and security.  
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(ii) Violations to Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
A violation to human rights and humanitarian law are considered as a 
threat to the peace. In Resolutions 1296 of April 19, 2000, 1314 of 
August 11, 2000, the Security Council stated that “the deliberate targeting 
of  civilian populations or other protected persons and the committing of 
widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law 
in situation of armed conflict may constitute a threat to international 
peace and security.  
(iii) Violation of Democratic Principle  
In 1993 and 1994, the Security Council determined the existence of a 
threat to international peace in Haiti as the overthrown government was 
not reinstated. In Resolution 1132 October 8,1997, the Security Council 
took measures to force the Sierra Leonean military junta to return to 
constitutional democratic order and to accept the return of the 
government in exile. The undemocratic change was part of a dangerous 
overall situation, in particular a severe destabilization of the countries, a 
degradation of the humanitarian situation, and refugee flows, but not the 
violation of democratic constituted threat to the peace.  
(iv) War against Terrorism  
In Resolution 1189 of August 13, 1998, the Security Council took part in 
the increasing effort of the international community to combat terrorism, 
through both general statements and concrete action20. In particular, in a 
number of cases, the Security Council considered insufficient action of 
states against terrorism as threats to the peace, for example, in 1992 Libya 
rejected to hand over two Libyans who had allegedly acted as agents for 
                                           
20 SC. Res. 1189 of August 13.1998; SC. Res. 1269 of October 19.1999; Sc. Res. 1373 of September 
28.2001.  
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Libya and had placed a bomb on Pan American flight 103 and destroyed 
it over Lockerbie, Scotland. The Security Council determined “that the 
failure by the Libyan Government to demonstrate by concrete actions its 
renunciation of terrorism and in particular its continued failure to respond 
fully and effectively to the requests in Resolution 731 (1992) constitute a 
threat to international peace and security”. In Resolutions 1373 of 
September 28, 2000 and 1377 of November 12, 2001, the Security 
Council declared that “any act of international terrorism constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security”.  
(v) Arms Control  
Some difficulties have arisen with respect to Security Council measures 
in the area of arms control. The Security Council enjoys the competence 
to enact arms embargoes in situation of crisis, and it has often made use 
of this power. For example, in 1992, the Security Council expressed the 
view that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security, and it has reaffirmed this 
position with regard to unclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan 
1998.  
8- Provisional Measures by Security Council 
The Security Council according to Article 40 can order provisional 
measures to prevent an aggravation of the situation. These measures can 
only by taken before making recommendations or determining the 
situation whether there are existence of any threat to the peace, breach to 
the peace, or acts of aggravation.  
The object of measures under Article 40 is to prevent an aggression of the 
situation. So, the persistence of hostilities is always an aggravation in the 
sense of Article 40 since it gives reason to fear possible expansion, and 
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constitutes a continuing breach of the peace. Likewise, provisional 
measures can be kept in place as long as the danger of renewed outbreak 
of hostilities persists.  
The Security Council is not limited to specific types of measures. 
Provisional measures would encompass the suspension of hostilities and 
troop withdrawal and conclusion of or adherence to a true call on states to 
agree to the stationing of UN truce-observers and to cooperate with it.  
Measures under Article 40 have provisional character and are not 
affecting the legal positions of the states concerned, particularly those 
parties to the dispute. It can oblige parties to the dispute to acknowledge 
temporarily a particular ceasefire line or to withdraw troops behind 
certain lines, for example, SC. Res. 82 of June 25, 1950 on Korea and SC. 
Res. 209 of September 4, 1950 on India and Pakistan.  
Article 40 does not specify whether measures on this basis may create 
binding effects for their addresses. Measures are considered necessary or 
desirable, by the Security Council to indicate recommentary character. 
Moreover, provisional measures by Security Council are binding only 
under condition of reciprocity. This applies in case of ceasefire order 
addressed to all parties to a conflict, which requires observance only if 
other parties credibly declare their readiness to do so as well. Also, 
provisional measures do restrict the right to self-defence of the parties 
under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. For example, 
during the conflict with Eritrea, Ethiopia claimed that the Security 
Council ceasefire orders were unlawful since they treated aggressor and 
defender alike21.                        
 
                                           
21 UN. Doc. s/pv. 3975. February 10.1999, p. 3.  
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9- Measures not Involving Armed Force  
Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates that: the 
Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed forces are to be employed to give affect to its decisions, and it may 
call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such measures. 
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations 
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication and the severance of diplomatic relations.   
(i) Historical Development  
The origin of Article 41 of the Charter is Article 16. Para 1of the League 
of Nations Covenant. According to it any member of the League which 
resort to war in disregard of the Covenant, was deemed to have 
committed an act of war against all other members of the League. The 
members of the League could impose such sanctions as severance of all 
intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of Covenant-
breaking state, whether a member of the League or not. As I have 
mentioned earlier the above sanctions under League of Nations Covenant 
were implemented independently by each state. Moreover, under 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals Chapter VIII, sect. B, No. 3, the Security 
Council should be empowered to determine what diplomatic, economic or 
other measures not involving the use of armed force should be employed 
to give effect to its decisions, and to call upon members of the 
organization to apply such measures. Such measures may include 
complete or partial interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio 
and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic 
relations.  
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(ii) Security Council Practice under Article 41      
After the end of the Cold War, enforcement action under Article 41 
become common instrument of peace maintenance. Article 41 has also 
been the basis for a range of other measures. For example, reaction to the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq 1990.  
Article 41 provides the legal basis for a number of a typical measures; 
these include the creation of international criminal tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 respectively, and the 
establishment of international administrations for territories such as 
Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. Article 41 provides the legal basis for all 
non-military enforcement measures. So, the Security Council can decide 
which measures should be taken in order to implement its decisions. But, 
these measures exclude action involving the use of force. Although 
Article 41 has mentioned several examples of non-enforcement measures, 
this enumeration is not exhaustive.  
The measures include: embargoes on arms and related materials, trade 
restrictions on petroleum or diamonds, travel and related sanctions which 
include prohibitions on the operation of air traffic in general or specific 
airlines, partly coupled with restrictions on the supply of spare parts for 
aircraft or insurances, restriction on representations or leaders of rebel 
movements. For example, sanctions against Iran leaders for refusal to 
stop unclear activities. Restriction on diplomatic relations on other 
measures which the Security Council may deem fit according to the 
circumstances of any situation.  
Measures under Article 41 may require third states to modify their 
relations with target state or impose obligation on the target itself. For 
example Resolution 687 (1991) the Security Council obliged Iraq to 
destroy different categories of weapons. Again, in Resolution 942 (1994) 
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the Security Council set a demand to the Bosnian Serbs to accept a 
specific plan for a territorial settlement.  
Non-military enforcement measures under Article 41 are subject to the 
general limits of Chapter VII action, i.e. to the purposes and principles of 
the organization, to the principle of proportionality, and to the exclusion 
of measures amounting to binding dispute settlement22. Implementation 
of non-military measures has proven to be unsatisfactory, because their 
enforcement depended upon the will and capabilities of the member 
states. Under Article 48, it is incumbent upon the member states to 
implement the measures decided upon by the Security Council under 
Article 41. The choice of means to fulfill this obligation is in general, left 
to them23. The Security Council has established numerous specialized 
bodies to facilitate and monitor the implementation of its measures by 
member states. For example, sanctions committee, which receive reports 
from member states or their implementing acts, decide on exceptions on 
humanitarian and other grounds, and specify the obligations deriving 
from Security Council resolutions. Moreover, the Security Council has 
charged the Secretary General or subsidiary organs to administer its 
measures instead of leaving the implementation to member states, for 
example, UN Compensation Commission for Iraq.  
Non-military measures have significantly contributed to building 
international administration and judicial structures in various fields. The 
Security Council in several cases took enforcement action precisely with 
the aim of ensuring compliance with measures taken under Article 41. 
Thus, it authorized individual states or regional organizations to use force 
to implement economic sanctions in the cases of Rhodesia, Iraq, 
Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Sierra Leone. The Security Council under Article 
                                           
22 Bruno Simma, Supra note 4, at 745.  
23 Ibid., p. 746.  
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41 can make recommendations of embargo measures under Article 39 if 
it does not wish to make binding decision24. Moreover, it can authorize 
member states to take such measures.  
10- Measures Involving the Use of Force 
Article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates that should the 
Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would 
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary the maintain or restore 
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstration, 
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of member of 
the United Nations. 
(i) Historical Development  
According to Article 16 Para 2 of the League of Nations Covenant, the 
duty of the League Council was to recommend to the several 
Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air forces the 
member of the League shall contribute to the armed force in the case of 
war or invasion25.   
So, Article 16 of the League contained a general duty for member states 
to render aid, but they were not at liberty to decide individually on the 
question of the necessity and practicability of military measures. The 
recommendations of the Council had no binding effect. Upon the 
weakness of enforcement mechanism of the League, consensus existed on 
furnishing the new organization with the authority to enforce 
international peace and security by force of arms if necessary26.  
                                           
24 SC Res. 1227, February, to, 1999, on Eritrea and Ethiopia conflict. SC. Res. 1295, April 18.2000 on 
Angola conflict.  
25 Article 16 Para 2 of the League of Nations Covenant.  
26 Bruno Simma, at 751.  
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(ii) Requirements to Resort to Measures Involving the Use of Force  
For the Security Council to resort to the measures under Article 42 the 
following conditions must be fulfilled:  
First, Art 42 of the Charter requires that for military action to become 
possible, the Security Council must consider non-military enforcement 
measures under Article 41 to be or to have been inadequate. It is possible 
that the Security Council can immediately resort to Article 42 without 
previous implementation of Article 41 on the basis of a prognosis of the 
ineffectiveness of measures under Article 41 or the possible danger of an 
expansion of a conflict and the potential damage involved. The Security 
Council must consider very carefully whether military action can be 
justified and whether it conforms to the principle of proportionality as 
recognized in international law.  
Secondly, military enforcement action under Article 42 always requires 
the determination of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act 
of aggression. So, Article 39 of the Charter contains the legal basis for the 
application of measures under both Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter of 
the United Nations.  
The Security Council in its resolutions must act on the basis of these 
provisions or at least Chapter VII should be mentioned. The Security 
Council has full power to decide whether to take military action.  
(ii) Military Enforcement Measures under Article 42 
Measures under Article 42 constitute enforcement measures. They are 
carried out against the will of the state concerned, and they can be taken 
against any state if the Security Council considers such action conducive 
to the maintenance or restoration of peace and security. It is neither 
necessary that the addressee had violated international law, nor that it 
 18
poses itself a threat to international peace and security27. In practice 
however, military measures will be taken above all against a state that 
refuses to comply with orders of the Security Council under Article 40.  
Article 42 allows for a wide range of measures. It empowers the Security 
Council to take action by air, sea or land forces if it considers necessary 
to maintain or restore international peace and security. The text of Article 
42 shows that it covers not only operations involving combat against 
other armed force, but also such action as demonstration and blockades. 
So the list of measures contained in Article 42 are not exhaustive.  
(iv) The Implementation of the Measures  
According to Article 42 the Security Council itself shall primarily 
implement military measures through forces at its disposal. These forces 
are to be made up by member states on the basis of agreements under 
Article 43 and the Security Council shall according to Article 47 directly 
control their generation.  
In practice the Security Council has chosen to authorize member states to 
use force, and such a decentralized implementation has become the most 
common way to take action under Article 42.  
The Charter does not state clearly whether, in the absence of agreement 
under Article 43 the Security Council should be able to act under Article 
42. Article 106 of the Charter of the UN mentions in this that the 
responsibility for military action should not lie with Security Council but 
with permanent members in joint action. 
According to some legal writers, in the absence of agreements under 
Article 43, the Security Council is able to take measures under Article 42 
                                           
27 Bruno Simma, Ibid, p. 755.  
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in particular through the authorization of member states to use force28. 
For example, in Resolutions 605 of August 25.1990 and 678 of 
November 29.1990 the Security Council called upon states to use force 
first in order to enforce the economic embargo and later to drive Iraq out 
of Kuwait. The scope of action authorized by Resolution 678 included the 
restoration of international peace and security in the area and thus 
reached well beyond that allowed under Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations. So, the Security Council can authorize member states, in 
groups or individually, to use force despite the lack of agreement under 
Article 43. For example, cases of Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, 
Albania and etc.  
With the creation of UN, it was envisaged that the Security Council 
would play a central role in the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace and security. To this end the United Nations member 
states agreed in Article 24 of the Charter to confer on the Council primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.  
Chapter VII as has been seen gives the Council certain prerogative, 
namely when the threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression 
has occurred (Art. 39); the authority to order provisional measures (Art. 
41); and the authority to order enforcement measures to be taken against a 
state that is to impose economic and military sanctions against a state.  
It seems clear that the Security Council has under Article 42 the sole 
prerogative to decide when it can order enforcement measures to be taken 
and the discretion as to what type of measures should be taken. Both 
these determinations are essentially political in character. The Charter 
does not, however, expressly state which entities the Council can use in 
its efforts to ensure the maintenance or restoration of international peace 
                                           
28 Bruno Aimma, Ibid. p. 757. Kelesen, p. 756.  
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and security. In case where the Council has imposed economic and 
military sanctions against a state or non-state entity, the Council has 
attempted to ensure the implementation of these sanctions by delegating 
its Chapter VII powers to UN principal organs, UN subsidiary organs, 
UN member states and regional arrangement or agencies. The reason for 
such delegations of powers is a practical one. The Security Council has 
had to delegate its Chapter VII powers to entities that have an 
enforcement capacity which the Security Council at present lacks29.      
The power to authorize member states to use force is not unconditional 
but is subject to the general limitations on the delegation of Chapter VII 
powers.  
This inclines a precise definition of the scope of the delegated powers and 
an effective supervision of their exercise by the delegating body. The 
Charter requires full information to the Security Council when regional 
organization is authorized under Article 53. There are limitations to the 
Security Council to delegate its powers under Article 42. These are: 
firstly, the Security Council must possess the power it is purporting to 
delegate. An organ cannot delegate powers which it does not itself 
possess. As they say in Latin: Nemo dat quod non habet, i.e. one cannot 
give what one does not possess. Secondly, there are the limitations which 
derive from application of the delegatus non potest delegare doctrine, i.e. 
A delegate cannot delegate30.      
The status of troops acting under Article 42 is determined by the nature of 
the operation. Where member states are authorized to apply force, the 
armed forces remain fully under their deployment and their control with 
                                           
29  Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security. p. 3. Oxford 
1999.  
30 Ibid., p. 12.  
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respect to both their deployment and their actual conduct31. Their acts are, 
therefore not attributable to the United Nations. But Sarooshi argues that 
the overall control by the Security Council makes acts of the forces 
primarily attributable to the United Nations.  
11- The Duties of the Member States to the Security Council 
(i) The Preparation of the Armed Force  
The member states of the UN undertake to make armed forces available 
to the Security Council, and to render assistance and to accord relief, 
including rights of passage, as necessary for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. This fundamental obligation, however, 
exists only in accordance with one or more special agreements. The 
member states must conduct negotiations in order to facilitate the 
conclusion of the relevant agreements, but no state may be coerced into 
accepting particular provisions in such agreements.  
(ii) The Content of the Agreement 
The agreement should contain specific provisions concerning, the armed 
forces to be made available to the Security Council, in particular to their 
location and to the procedure the Security Council could use to call upon 
them. Moreover, it should determine which rights of passage are to be 
granted, the numbers and stationing of forces as well as the means of 
support and facilities for assistance and the provision on the distribution 
of costs between the UN and the member states.  
As understood from Article 43 the Security Council has general 
competence to conclude and execute the agreements, on behalf of the 
UN, but states remain free to decide whether to dispatch forces in a 
                                           
31 Bruno Simma, Supra note at p. 759. Saroodhi, Ibid, p. 163.  
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particular situation. So any military enforcement action will be taken only 
if there are enough states ready to engage in a particular situation. The SC 
with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee shall make plans for 
the application of armed forces32. The Military Staff Committee consists 
of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members of the SC or their 
representatives. For an expansion of the UN military system the 
committee can create regional sub-committees. The Committee has three 
functions:  
(a) Advising and assisting the SC in all military questions relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security, especially in the 
creation of the military infrastructure of the UN envisaged by Articles 
43, 45, 46, 47, of the Charter of the UN.  
(b)  Assisting in the command and direction of the force placed at the 
disposal of the SC: Article 47 (1), (2), of the Charter of the UN. 
(c)  Undertaking an advisory role in the field of the regulation of 
armaments and disarmaments: Article 47 (1) of the Charter of the UN. 
12- Compensation for Enforcement Measures  
Any state confronted with economic problems arising from the carrying 
out of enforcement measures by the SC against any state, shall consult the 
SC to solve or aid in solving those problems. For example, during the 
Kuwait crisis in 1990, and immediately after sanction had been imposed 
upon Iraq, numerous states requested assistance under Article 50. The SC 
entrusted the Sanctions Committee under Resolution 661, of August       
6, 1990 with the task of examining requests for assistance under the 
provision of Article 50 of the Charter of the UN. 
                                           
32 Article 46 of the Charter of the United Nations.  
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In the case of former Yugoslavia the adoption of Resolution 757 of May 
30, 1992 which specially cited Article 50 the SC received requests under 
Article 50 by eight countries. Under the mandate of Resolution 843 of 
June 18, 1993, the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee examined the 
applications and presented its recommendations to the SC, recognized the 
urgent need to assist the affected countries in copying with their special 
problems and applying to all states to provide immediate technical, 
financial and material assistance.  
13- The Delegation of Chapter VII Powers to Regional Arrangements 
Article 53 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations gives the Council the 
competence to delegate Chapter VII powers to regional arrangements. It 
states that the SC shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional 
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But 
no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by 
regional agencies without the authorization of the SC. The authorization 
by the SC of a regional arrangement to take military enforcement action 
under Chapter VIII represents the delegation of Chapter VII powers by 
the Council33.  
Article 54 regulates the obligation of regional arrangement or agencies to 
inform the SC with undertaking for the maintenance of international 
peace and security34.  
                                           
33 Saroodhi, Supra note 29, at p. 249.  
34 Bruno Simma, Supra note 4, at p. 891.  
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14- Some disputes may be referred to as illustrations 
(i) Arab Armies and Israel  
The first invocation of Chapter VII by the Security Council was on July 
15, 1948 between Arab Armies and Israel. Under Resolution 54 (1948) 
the SC ordered cease-fire pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of UN, and 
threatened the parties to the conflict to apply further measures under 
Chapter VII if they failed to comply with that Resolution. The Council 
sent UN truce observers to ensure that the cease-fire was adhered to.  
(ii) North Korea and South Korea Conflict  
In Resolution 1551 of June 27, 1958 the SC invoked Chapter VII and 
found that North Korea action constituted a breach of the peace and 
recommended that the members of United Nations furnish assistance as 
may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international 
peace and security in the area.  
(iii) Iraq Invasion Kuwait 1990-1  
The SC invoked Chapter VII in response to that invasion. Professor Oscar 
Schacher has observed that it was not the first time a state used force to 
seek recovery of territory it claimed as its own but it was the first time 
since the founding of the UN that entire territory of a member state was 
forcibly annexed35.        
In Resolution 665 (1990) the SC condemned the invasion and 
characterized it as a breach of the peace (Art, 39 & 40) of the Charter of 
the UN. In Resolution 661 (1990) the SC imposed sanctions under Article 
40 of the Charter of the UN, while in Resolution 665 (1990) the SC took 
                                           
35 O. Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 80 AMJ, Intl (AJIL) 452, 453, 1991.  
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necessary measures to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in 
order to answer strict implementation of the embargo.  
In Resolution 678 (1990) the SC authorized the states to co-operate with 
Kuwait to take necessary steps, including the use of force to uphold and 
implement the Council’s prior resolutions and to restore peace and 
security in the area.  
Thomas Franck wonders whether this resolution authorized an 
enforcement measures, implementing Article 42 of the Charter or was a 
mere grant of authority to states to use military force in individual and 
collective self-defence within the meaning of Article 51. This an 
important and much debated point36. Whatever the answer it was clearly 
an invocation of Chapter VII jurisdiction.  
14- Conclusion 
The basic principle is prohibition of the use of force in international 
relations and encouragement of the pacific means for solving all kinds of 
disputes between states. 
The United Nations before resort to coercive measures against aggressor 
state shall first recourse to pacific settlement of disputes.  
This includes negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements and other 
peaceful means chosen by the parties to the dispute.  
War was prohibited under many treaties. For example, under Hague 
convention of 1899 and 1907, the league of Nations Covenant 1919 
which prohibited resort to war before judicial settlement and arbitration, 
the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 
1924, which prohibits stats to resort to war except in self-defence, the 
                                           
36 Thomas M Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, p. 231.Oxford 2002.   
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Briand-kellogy Pact 1928 prohibited war and recourse to it, the 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Disputes of states 1933 
prohibits intervention in the internal and external affairs of other states 
and prohibited recognition of territorial acquisitions obtained by force. 
The application of sanctions mentioned in the above treaties depended on 
the willingness of the member states. The system of sanctions under the 
above treaties was weak and unsatisfactory. This led to creation of 
security council with strong coercive power able to counter threats of war 
immediately. The Security Council has power under chapter VII to 
determine the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act 
of aggression. It can make recommendation, order provisional measures, 
or take non-military or military enforcement. These measures are binding 
on member states if the Security Council so decides. 
Although, the Charter of the United Nations prohibits the use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state and 
prohibits the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, the main exception is that 
sovereignty principle is disregarded when the Security Council exercises 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII. Enforcement measures are 
applied when there is threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression. Moreover, the violations of human rights and crimes against 
humanity, which arise from civil war, are considered as a threat to the 
breach of international peace and are no longer deemed as an internal 
matter within the state.                      
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Use of Force by the United Nations 
In the Case of Humanitarian Intervention 
 
1- Historical Background  
The Law governing humanitarian situations was developed from the 
middle of the nineteenth century. It covers the following principles:  
- The treatment of prisoners of war.  
- Civilians in occupied territory.  
- Sick and wounded personnel; and  
- Human rights in situation of conflict.37  
However, there were no rules which allow states to intervene in other 
states to protect human rights or for any other humanitarian purpose. The 
League of Nations 1919 and the Council of the League was not allowed 
to intervene in domestic matters of its members for protection of human 
rights and other humanitarian situations.  
2- The UN Charter  
The position under UN Charter is not straightforward. Article 2 (7) of the 
Charter prohibits UN to intervene in domestic matters except under 
Chapter VII. But the question is whether violation of human rights and 
other humanitarian law be considered as a threat to the peace or breach of 
the peace which allows the Security Council to apply measures 
mentioned under Article 39,41 and 42 of the Charter of the UN.  
3- Bases for Humanitarian Intervention  
                                           
37 Malcolm M. Shaw, International Law 5th ed. Cambridge University Press, p. 1054.  
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There is still no consensus in international legal doctrine on the 
unlawfulness of forcible humanitarian intervention, that is the use of 
armed forces for the prevention or discontinuation of massive violations 
of human rights in a foreign state.  
Some American writers in their views regard forcible humanitarian 
intervention as lawful given certain pre-conditions. They argue that the 
use of force on strictly humanitarian grounds is directed neither, against 
the (territorial integrity) nor the (political independence) of other states, 
and moreover, is in conformity with the (most fundamental peremptory 
norms of the Charter.38     
According to Simma, forcible humanitarian intervention under the UN 
Charter can no longer be considered lawful.39  
However, the gross and widespread violation of human rights which 
arises from civil war can be considered as threating international peace 
and security since majority population is effected, whether they are killed, 
displaced or made refugees.  
The preamble of the Charter of the United Nations is to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human person, in the equal rights of the men and women, and of nations 
large and small, and to promote social progress and better standard of life 
in large freedom. Again, in Article 1 (3) of the Charter of the United 
Nations,  one of the purposes of UN is to promote and respect human 
rights without distinction as to race, six, language or religion.  
                                           
38 Fonteyne J. P. The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: its current 
validity under the UN Charter, Calif IV. Int. L. L. J 4 (1974) pp. 203 – 79 at 258.  
Verwey W. Humanitarian Intervention, in Cassese, current legal regulation, pp. 57 – 78 at 74 – 5  
Abiew F. K. The Evocation of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention (1999), 
especially pp. 27 – 81.     
39 Bruno Simma, The Charter of the United Nations. A commentary, 2nd ed. Vol I, Oxford University 
Press, p. 130.   
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There are many articles in the Charter which deal with human rights. 
Thus, Article 13 (1) (b) states that General Assembly shall initiate studies 
and recommendations for assisting human rights fundamental freedom. 
According to Art 55 the United Nations shall promote universal respect 
for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion and higher 
standard of living.  
Member states pledge to take joint and separate action with the United 
Nations for the achievement of human rights and economic and social 
development. The Economic and Social Council may make 
recommendation for promoting respect for, and observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedom.  
Under Chapter VII, a violation of human rights and humanitarian law are 
considered as a threat to the peace. That was the view in San Francisco 
Conference. However, most commentators in the early period objected to 
this view. They invoked the internal character of the respective situations 
and the distribution of powers within the UN, which assigned the 
implementation of human rights to the GA and ECOSOC, but not to the 
SC. For example when Poland brought the circumstances in Spain before 
the SC in 1946, the SCs Committee of inquiry concluded that the fascist 
regime in Spain did not as such represent a threat to the peace. However, 
in Rhodesia, the SC condemned the racist minority regime and 
determined that the continuation of the regime would be a threat to the 
peace. Also, the apartheid policy in South Africa was considered as a 
threat to the peace. So, on this basis, the conditions within a state, such as 
massive violations of human rights, could themselves constitute a threat 
to the peace.  
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Recent practice supports that view. In 1991 the SC determined under Res. 
688 April, 5, 1991 that the consequences of the repression of Kurdish 
population in North Iraq, in particular the refugee flows and cross-border 
incursions, constituted a threat to the peace. In the case of Somalia, the 
SC determined that the magnitude of the human tragedy constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security.40  The same was true with both 
Rwanda and Eastern Zaire. The SC found the threat to peace in the 
magnitude of the humanitarian crisis.41   
The lesson from the above cases is that, the severe and widespread 
suffering of the civilian population in armed conflicts can give rise to a 
threat to international peace and security.42 That was reaffirmed and 
adopted unanimously by SC in its Resolutions 1296 of April, 19, 2000 
and 1314 of August 11, 2000, which stated that the deliberate targeting of 
civilian populations or widespread violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict may 
constitute a threat to international peace and security.  
                                           
40 SC. Res. 794, December 3. 1992 on Somalia.  
41 SC. Res. 929, June 22. 1994 on Rwanda, 1078 November 9. 1996 on Zaire.   
42 Bruno Simma, supra, p. 724.   
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4- Crimes which allow the UN to Intervene for Protection of Human 
Right and Humanitarian Crisis 
Crimes against humanitarian law are described under Article 5 of Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, which came into force 
in 2002. They are:    
(i) The Crime of Genocide 
The term genocide is defined under Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court 1998 (ICC). It means any of the following acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group such as:  
- Killing member of the group;  
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to member of the group;  
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated o 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;  
- Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;      
- Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.43 
The physical protection of the group as a distinct identity is clearly the 
first and paramount factor. The Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide whether committed in time of war 
or peace, is a crime under international law.44 This can be seen in the two 
cases of Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia.      
The International Tribunal for Rwanda was established to deal with 
international crime of genocide committed by individuals within defined 
geographical and chronological jurisdiction limits. It was emphasized that 
rape and sexual violence may amount to genocide when committed 
                                           
43 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Art 6 
44 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948.  
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within the necessary specific intent to commit genocide. It was also held 
that genocide may be committed by omission as well as by acts.  
The International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Application of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina V. Yugoslavia) was face with Bosnian claims that 
Yugoslavia had violated the Genocide Convention. The Court in its Order 
of 8 April 1993 on the Request for the Indication of Provisional 
Measures, held that Article 9 of the Convention provided a valid 
jurisdictional basis, while reaffirming the view expressed, in the Advisory 
opinion stated that the crime of genocide shocks the conscience of 
mankind, result in great losses to humanity and is contrary to moral law 
and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations45.  
(ii) Crimes against Humanity  
Article 7 of ICC defines the crimes against humanity to mean any of 
following acts when committed as a part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack. 
- Murder;  
- Extermination;  
- Enslavement;  
- Deportation or forcible transfer of population;  
- Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law;  
- Torture;   
- Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforces sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity.  
                                           
45 ICJ Report, 1993, p. 3.  
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- Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other 
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this 
paragraph;  
- Enforced disappearance of persons;  
- The crime of apartheid;  
- Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing 
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health.  
- And any kind of discrimination46.  
For indigenous people, they have the right to self-determination, and right 
to protection from ethnocide and cultural genocide, and to maintain and 
develop distinct identities.47 
(iii) War Crimes 
War crimes are defined in Art 8 of the ICC to mean the following:    
a) Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions 1949 
Namely, the following acts against persons or property protected under 
the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:48  
- Willful killing;  
- Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;  
- Willful causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;  
                                           
46 International Convention of Civil and Political Rights 1966, Arts 2 (1), 26. International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965.  
47 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 1994.  
48 ICC 1998 Art 8.  
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- Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified 
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;        
- Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in 
the forces of a hostile power; 
- Willful depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the 
rights of fair and regular trial;  
- Unlawful deportion or transfer or unlawful confinement;  
- Taking of hostages.  
b) Violations of the Law and Customs Applicable in International 
Armed Conflict 
These violations consist of:  
- Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as 
such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in 
hostilities;  
- Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects;  
- Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, 
materials, units vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection to civilians or 
civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;  
- Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack 
will cause incidental loss of life or injuring to civilians or damage 
to civilian objects or widespread long-term and severe damage to 
the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
anticipated;  
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- Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, 
dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not 
military objectives;  
- Killings or wounding combatant who, having laid down his arms or 
having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;  
- Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the 
military insignia and uniform of the enemy or of the United 
Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva 
Conventions, resulting in death or serious personal injury;  
- The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the occupying power of parts 
of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the 
deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the 
occupied territory within or outside this territory;  
- Intentionally directing attacks against building dedicated to 
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic 
monuments, hospital and places where the sick and wounded are 
collected, provided thus are not military objectives;  
- Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to 
physical mutilation or to medical scientific experiments of any kind 
which are neither justified by the medical dental or hospital 
treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her 
interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health 
of such person or persons;  
- Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the 
hostile nation or army;  
- Declaring that no quarter will be given;  
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- Destroying or seizing the enemy’s property unless such destruction 
or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;  
- Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law 
rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party;  
- Compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take a part in the 
operations of war directed against their own country, even if they 
were in the belligerent’s service before the commencement of the 
war;  
- Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault; 
- Employing poison or poisoned weapons;  
- Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all 
analogous liquids materials or devices;  
- Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human 
body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely 
cover the core or is pierced with incisions;  
- Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of 
warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in 
violation of the international law of armed conflict, provided that 
such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are 
the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an 
annex to this statute, by an amendment in accordance with the 
relevant provisions set forth in Articles 121 and 123;  
- Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment;  
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- Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual 
violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions;  
- Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected persons to 
render certain points, areas or military forces immune from 
military operations;  
- Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical 
units and transport, and personal using the distinctive emblems of 
the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law;  
- Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare 
by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, 
including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under 
the Geneva Conventions;  
- Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years 
into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively 
in hostilities.  
c) Acts Committed against Persons taking no Active Part in the 
Hostilities  
This list for these offences is short. It includes:    
- Violence to life person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;  
-  Committing outrages upon personal dignity in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment;  
- Taking of hostages;  
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- The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally 
recognized as indispensable.  
d) Other Serious Violations of the Laws and Customs Applicable in 
Armed Conflicts within the Territory of a State 
These offences are made for non-international armed conflicts i.e. 
conflicts between the government authorities and organized armed groups 
or between such groups (Civil War). The list of offences is long. It 
comprises:   
- Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as 
such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in 
hostilities;  
- Intentionally directing attacks against buildings material, medical 
units and transport, and personal using the distinctive emblems of 
the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law;  
- Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to 
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic 
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are 
collected, provided they are not military objectives;  
- Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;  
- Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual 
violence;  
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- Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years 
into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities;  
- Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons 
related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved 
or imperative military reasons so demand;  
- Willing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;  
- Declaring that no quarter will be given;  
- Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the 
conflict to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific 
experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, 
dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out 
in his or her interest, and which causes death to or seriously 
endanger the health of such person or persons;  
- Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such 
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities 
of the conflict.  
However, Art 8 (3) of ICC gives right to government to maintain or re-
establish law and order in the state or to defend the unity and territorial 
integrity of the state.  
 
5- A Delegation of Powers to achieve Humanitarian Objectives  
(i) Traditional Humanitarian Intervention  
Traditional humanitarian intervention is defined as military and non-
military action to stop the gross and widespread violations of human 
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rights occurring within a state; and for that reason it has traditionally been 
directed against the authority in control the state in question.49 
(ii) A Delegation of Chapter VII Power 
A delegation by the Security Council of its Chapter VII powers for the 
achievement of humanitarian objectives constitutes, in legal terms, a form 
of UN authorized humanitarian intervention. In this case the Security 
Council delegation of Chapter VII powers action may be taken against an 
authority in control of a certain territory. The objectives, however, which 
have been specified by the Council often do not only involve the stopping 
of the gross and widespread violations of human rights but also for other 
humanitarian purposes; e.g. ensuring the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance.  
Nonetheless, the Council has attempted to deal with humanitarian crises 
by using the common technique of delegating its Chapter VII powers to 
Member States to carry out and command military enforcement action in 
order to achieve a variety of objectives. For this to occur the Council 
needs to link gross violation of human rights occurring within a country 
to a threat to, or breach of international peace and security. In other 
words, the Council must make an Article 39 determination; a necessary 
prerequisite for the council to be able to use or even delegate its Chapter 
VII powers.  
(iii) Some Cases where the Security Council has Delegated Chapter 
VII Military Enforcement Powers to Member States to achieve 
Humanitarian Objectives        
a) The Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia 
                                           
49 Sarooshi, The United Nations and the development of Collective Security, Oxford, p. 210.  
 41
The lack of law and order in Somalia meant that humanitarian assistance 
was not being delivered effectively to the civilian population. In 
Resolution 751 the Security Council set up a peacekeeping force, the 
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The main objectives 
of that force was the protection of humanitarian assistance operations. 
The Council Resolution 794 requested the states exercising delegated 
Chapter VII powers to report to it on regular basis, to enable the Council 
to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued 
peacekeeping operations.  
The reporting requirement is an essential component of the Council’s 
exercise of its overall authority and control over the use of its delegated 
Chapter VII powers. This is important for the Council to decide when its 
specified objectives had been achieved and thus when the delegation of 
the powers was to be terminated.  
b) The Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance in Bosnia         
In Resolution 770 (1992), the Security Council delegated Chapter VII 
enforcement powers in former Yugoslavia to UNPROFOR. It was 
delegating a coercive power to UNPROFOR to use military force to 
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
The Council stated “The provision of humanitarian assistance is 
important element to restore international peace and security in the 
area”.50  
c) The Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance and the Creation of a 
Secure Environment in Albania  
                                           
50 Sarooshi, supra, 12, 218.  
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In response to the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in Albania, 
the Security Council provided the legal framework for action under 
Resolution 1101 (1997). It stated that “The present situation of crisis in 
Albania constitutes a threat to the Resolution establishing temporary 
multinational protection force under command of Italy to achieve two 
objectives:  
- To facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian 
assistance, environment for the mission of international 
organization in Albania;  
- To ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel 
of the said multinational protection force.  
The Resolution 1101 requested multinational protection force to provide 
periodic reports through Secretary-General to the Security Council.  
d) The Establishment of a Safe Heaven in Rwanda 
The humanitarian situation in Rwanda from mid-1994 was by all 
accounts appalling. There was massacre of civilians from particular 
ethnic groups on genocidal scale. In Resolutions 918 and 925 the Council 
gave the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) a 
mandate to intervene in order to end massacre. France and Senegal sent 
forces to establish and maintain safe humanitarian areas in the country to 
try and prevent further genocide from occurring. That action was 
authorized by the Security Council in Resolution 929 (1994). In that 
Resolution the SC determined that the magnitude of the humanitarian 
crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region, 
and authorized Member States to use all necessary means to achieve the 
humanitarian objectives, protection of displaced persons, refugees and 
civilians at risk and delivery of humanitarian assistance, within the period 
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of two months. The SC requested Member States concerned and the 
Secretary-General to report to the Council on regular basis. 
e) The Establishment of a Safe Area in Iraq 
After the end of Second Gulf War 1991, the Shia rebels in the South of 
Iraq and Kurdish in the North tried to overthrow the Government of 
Saddam Hussein. However, Iraqi forces brutally crushed them. The 
consequence was that a large number of refugees tried to flee into 
neighbouring countries to escape retribution by Iraqi forces. The Security 
Council, in response to this humanitarian crisis, passed Resolution 688 
which condemned “The repression of the Iraqi civilian population in 
many parts of Iraq… the consequences of which threaten international 
peace and security”.            
On 16 April 1991 the US, the UK and France under the code name 
“Operation Provide Comfort, sent troops into the Northern Iraq to 
establish security zone. This security zone was to provide a safe area for 
the return of fleeing Iraq citizens. This safe haven was created by forcing 
Iraqi troops to cease operations north of the 36th parallel. Iraq opposed at 
first the establishment of the safe havens, but said later that it would not 
hinder them in order to allow humanitarian relief efforts to proceed, and 
call the UN to assume responsibility for the safe-haven operations. 
Sarooshi, raised this question “whether the action of coalition forces can 
be characterized in legal term as an exercise of delegated Chapter VII 
powers? Two possibilities:  
First the Security Council Resolution 688 delegated Chapter VII powers 
to Member States in order to address the humanitarian crisis in Iraq;  
Second the delegation to Member States in Resolution 678 to use all 
necessary measures to restore international peace and security continued 
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to exist and that since Iraq’s repression constituted a threat to 
international peace, Member States were, accordingly justified in 
militarily intervening to stop the source of the threat to international 
peace. US president Bush mentioned that the refugee relief effort was 
announced as “humanitarian effort under the auspices of UN Security 
Council resolution 688 that needed no further authorization. The 
Secretary-General criticized the coalition’s unilateral action stating that 
Iraq’s consent was necessary for such intervention in its territory to be 
legal.  
The UK Foreign Office holds that action is justified by reference to the 
customary international law principles of humanitarian intervention.51   
f) Humanitarian Situation in Darfur, Western Sudan  
Upon fighting between Sudan Government and different groups of rebels 
in Darfur region and other militia groups, the situation of civilian 
population and other human rights became worst. Some International 
Organizations and states described it as genocide among Darfur people, 
e.g. US described the situation in Darfur as a genocide.  
Among the Reports of International Organizations concerning the 
humanitarian situation in Darfur as killing civilians at least 200,000, 
displaced of many and flee refugees to Chad. The Security Council set 
Resolution 1706 under Chapter VII to order peacekeeping forces in that 
region by United Nations to protect civilians. However it provided in that 
Resolution the consent of the Sudan government, which is a party of 
dispute. Thus situation let the Darfur rebel leader Abdul Wahid Nur to 
accuse the United Nations, Security Council and European Community of 
double standard measures for humanitarian intervention, compared with 
what happened in Bosnia. He argued that the “Security Council ought to 
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send international force with clear mandate to protect Darfur civilians 
under the authority of Chapter VII”.52 
Ian Pronk, envoy of United Nations in the Sudan, described the situation 
in Darfur  as “mass killing and in the chasing away from their homes of 
more than one million people, the government of the Sudan had 
continued allow or support the cleansing and killing without being 
hindered by the international community”. He criticized the Security 
Council when it decided to send peacekeeping forces under Chapter VI 
which require consent of the Sudan government. He argued that 
peacekeeping can only take place when there is peace. “There was no 
response to the violations, neither in the form of sanctions nor a mission. 
So the Security Council by its inaction is eroding its own authority.53       
The Government of Sudan refused the UN troops and suggested hybrid 
which should consist of AU, UN (but not allowed to wear blue helmets) 
and the government itself. This means that the government has political 
power not only to give or withhold or withdraw its consent to a 
peacekeeping force, but also to veto all troops movements and all steps 
that the forces may deem necessary to protect civilians.  
Humanitarian intervention by the United Nations under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations does not require consent of the state 
violate human rights and humanitarian law. Only the peacekeeping force 
require the consent.  
6- Conclusion 
Crimes against humanity and humanitarian law has caused tragedy 
among human beings. However, there is no specific article in the Charter 
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of the United Nations to allow the use of force for humanitarian 
intervention. The only exception is Article 2 (7) when the United Nations 
is applying Chapter VII. Most of these crimes happen during civil war or 
other internal conflicts, and so the UN and the SC is reluctant to interfere.  
Recently, the Security Council has delegated its Chapter VII powers for 
the achievement of humanitarian objectives. So, the objectives for 
intervention include not only gross and widespread violations of human 
rights, but also other humanitarian purpose, like delivering of 
humanitarian assistance.  
So, the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are 
found by the Security Council as threating international peace and 
security, although, they happen within a state. The Security Council 
delegates its Chapter VII powers to Member States or other regional 
arrangements to stop these crimes.          
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CHAPTER THREE 
Peace-keeping 
 
1- Historical Background 
Military intervention in the peace-keeping process was first planned by 
the League of Nations, during the Polish-Lithuanian conflict concerning 
the city of Vilna. An international force was established for the 
maintenance of order during a plebiscite. The second case in which an 
international force was established under he League of Nations occurred 
during the temporary administration of the city of Leticia, situated on the 
Peruvian-Colombian border. It was set up by a committee of the League 
of Nations based on agreement between the two states.     
2- Peace-keeping under the United Nations  
The United Nations has developed special procedure for the maintenance 
of peace by using military elements and units. The Charter of the United 
Nations creates a system of collective security, which provides for a 
forceful reaction by the international community to a breach of 
international peace. International community is supposed to exert 
pressure on the peace-breaker either by non-military coercion, or by the 
use of military force. But the most suitable way is the peace-keeping by 
consensus and co-operation. Consensus is important at least among the 
Security Council members and co-operation by other states is necessary 
where these states can provide services to the parties to a dispute and to 
the UN. Military elements and units have become an important element 
of support for this process of conflict resolution by co-operation and 
consensus54. There are two kinds of military units.  
                                           
54 Bruno Simma, The Charter of the United Nations. A commentary, 2nd ed. vol. 1. Oxford 2002. 
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First is military observers group; and the second is peace-keeping force, 
whose main function is to facilitate ceasefire and prevent a resurgence of 
hostilities. However, the purpose of these military units is not to impose a 
particular conflict solution by military force. Consent of local parties, 
impartiality and use of force only in self-defence are bedrock principles 
of peace-keeping.  
There are many episodes where the United Nations uses military forces in 
order to maintain peace. The peace-keeping forces can be established in 
conflicts between states or internal disputes between the government of 
the state and rebel group or groups or between different fighting groups.  
(i) The Balkan Conflict (1946-51)  
The first peace-keeping force established by the United Nations was 
during the Balkan conflict (1946-51). In that conflict there were Greek 
allegations of border incursions from the northern neighbouring states. 
The Security Council established military observers to investigate these 
allegations. Later, an observation group was established by the General 
Assembly.  
(ii) The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGL) 
1958  
In 1958, the United Nations established observation group in Lebanon 
after internal unrest. The mandate was to observe the traffic of arms and 
facilitate the withdrawal of American troops which had intervened in the 
conflict.  
(iii) The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNGCYP), 1964 to Date 
In 1964, the United Nations established peace-keeping force in Cyprus 
because of the conflict between Greek and Turkish55. Its mandate was to 
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prevent a recurrence of fighting and contribute to the maintenance and 
restoration of law and order, and to stand as an inter-position force 
between two communities, and some humanitarian functions. The peace-
keeping force is continuing up to date.  
(iv) The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 1978 to 
Date  
In March 1978 after Isreali intervention in Southern Lebanon, the 
Security Council by Resolution 524 (1978) requested the withdrawal of 
Isreali troops and created UNIFIL, for the purpose of confirming 
withdrawal, restoring international peace and security, and assisting the 
government of Lebanon in ensuring the establishment of its effective 
authority56. The mandate has been changed after the last war between 
Israel and Hizeb Allah in 2006.  
(v) The United Nations Operation on Mozambique (ONUMOZ) 1992-4  
On 4 October 1992, a General Peace Agreement was signed between the 
parties to the civil war which had raged in Mozambique for the last 14 
years. This agreement called for the United Nations participation in 
monitoring its implementation, in providing technical assistance for the 
general elections and monitoring that election57. In its Resolution 782 
(1992)58 the Security Council authorized the dispatch of 25 UN military 
observers. By Resolution 797 (1992) the Security Council decided to 
established ONUMOZ on the basis of a report submitted by the 
Secretary-General. It comprised military and civilian personnel. The 
ceasefire, the separation and concentration of forces of the two parties, 
their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of 
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weapons, to monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign 
forces, and to provide security for civilians and UN activities. Its mandate 
was terminated in December 199459. 
(vi) The United Nations observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), 
1993 to Date 
In the internal conflict between the Georgian Government and Abkhazia, 
a ceasefire agreement was concluded60. It provided for UN observers and 
peace-keeping forces61. The Security Council established a United 
Nations Observer Mission in Georgia. Their task is to verify compliance 
with the ceasefire agreements and to investigate and reports or 
violations62. Upon the failure of that force UNOMIG another peace 
keeping force of the Commonwealth of the independent states was 
deployed.    
(vii) United Nations in East Timor 
On July 11,1999, the Security Council established by Resolution 1246 the 
United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)63, the task of which 
was to organize and conduct the popular consultation on East Timor 
giving the inhabitants of East Timor the choice to decide either to become 
an autonomous province of Indonesia or an independent state. After the 
referendum and the choice for independence, the Indonesia military and 
militias started killing and expelling Timorese from their home. The 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1264 of September 15,199964, 
authorizing under Chapter VII, the establishment of multinational force, 
later replaced by UN peace-keeping mission. Its task was to restore peace 
and security, protect and support UNAMET and facilitate humanitarian 
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assistance operations. In the Resolution 1272 (1999), the Security 
Council established under Chapter VII, the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) which has both legislative and 
executive authority and also administration of justice.  
(vii) United Nation Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), 2000 
to Date  
Continuing disagreement concerning the border demarcation led to the 
eruption of fighting between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998. By the 
Security Council Resolution 1312 of July 30.2000, the United Nations 
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea was authorized to monitor the cessation 
of hostilities and to assist in ensuring the observance of security 
commitments.  
3- Formation of the Peace-Keeping Force  
The UN peace-keeping force is UN subsidiary organs. It is established by 
the Security Council or General Assembly. However, it has been the 
consistent practice of the Council to delegate to the Secretary-General its 
Chapter VII power to establish and constitute that force. The Secretary-
General does not himself possess the authority under the Charter to 
establish UN peace-keeping forces. Only the Security Council and 
General Assembly possess that power65.  
Accordingly, the establishment of the UN peace-keeping forces by the 
Secretary-General represents the exercise of a delegated power. UN 
peace-keeping forces are UN subsidiary organs that are established under 
the authority of either Security Council or General Assembly. It follows 
that the Secretary-General does not possess the competence unilaterally 
to terminate a UN peace-keeping force, unless this power has been 
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expressly delegated to him by relevant principal organ. For example, the 
unilateral decision by the Secretary-General to order the withdrawal of 
UNEF from Egyptian territory was ultra vires. In the peace-keeping force 
there is distinction which must be made between the consent of the 
principle organ establishing the peace-keeping force and the consent of 
both the states which contribute troops to the force and the state where 
the force is to be deployed. It is a fundamental requirement of UN peace-
keeping that the deployment of a peace-keeping force is conditional on 
the consent of both states contributing troops to be deployed and the host 
state.  
The participation by a state in the establishment of subsidiary organ can 
not affect the rights which a state may otherwise enjoy under the 
Charter66.          
(i) The Power to Establish UN Peace-Keeping Forces  
The UN Charter does not provide in express terms for the establishment 
or use of UN peace-keeping forces. This power has been raised by the 
International Court of Justice in the Expense case (1962). The court found 
that the Security Council has the implied power to establish UN peace-
keeping forces, and it has the competence to delegate to the Secretary-
General the power to establish peace-keeping forces. The Secretary-
General has stressed the basic principles of consent of parties, 
impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence. These 
principles are:  
• The task of protecting humanitarian operations during continuing 
warfare.  
• Protecting civilian populations in safe area.  
• Pressing the parties to achieve national reconciliation.  
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It has been asserted that peace-keeping forces must never be deployed 
into an environment in which there is no ceasefire or peace agreement67.  
Professor Gray indicates that there is no article in the Charter of the UN 
that provides for peace-keeping68. The experience of involving UN peace-
keeping forces in former Yugoslavia and Somalia in the use of force 
beyond the traditional self-defence, led the UN peace-keeping forces to 
be a part of the conflict.  
(ii) The Exercise of Command and Control Powers over UN Peace-
Keeping Forces 
The Charter provides a framework for decision making by the Council 
when exercising command and control powers over a UN force. The 
authority for the command and control of UN peace-keeping forces 
established by the Security Council rests solely with the Council. 
However, this power is subject to the consideration of host state, because 
UN peace-keeping forces are based on consent, that is, forces are 
voluntarily contributed by states69. So the consensual nature of UN peace-
keeping operations means that without an express change in its mandate a 
peace-keeping force cannot be used to carry out military enforcement 
action.  
It is generally accepted that the use of force by UN peace-keeping forces 
in self-defence is lawful. But the question is who should decide when 
force should be used and for what purpose? The consent of the Secretary-
General or his Special Representative is required. Because the Secretary-
General is the Commander-in-Chief of UN peace-keeping forces. For 
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example, in Resolution 886, concerning former Yugoslavia, the Security 
Council delegated to member states and regional organizations the 
competence to use force in response to attacks on UNPROFOR.  
UN peace-keeping forces had played good role to preserve stability 
within states involved in civil wars as well as between states. However, 
many challengers had arisen and facing them. They were faced by 
irregular forces, civilian were the main victims of the conflicts, civil 
conflicts brought humanitarian emergencies and refugees, state 
institutions collapsed70.  
(iii) Traditional UN Peace-Keeping Forces Theory  
According to this theory there are three principles: the consent of the 
parties; impartiality; and the use of force in self-defence.  
(iv) Contemporaneous Peace-Keeping Theory   
There are three principles: first, the protection of humanitarian operations 
during continuing warfare. Second, protecting civilian populations in safe 
areas and maintain civil law and order, establishing local police forces. 
Third, pressing the parties to achieve national reconciliation at a pace 
faster than they were ready to accept.  
4- The Status of UN Military Units under International Law 
As peace-keeping forces and observer groups are organs of the UN, the 
law applicable to the UN as a legal person determines the conduct, the 
rights, and the duties of a peace-keeping force or observer group. This 
general rule has several specific consequences, first that the Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations applies, and 
secondly, that the general customary rules of international law concerning 
liability are applicable, whether the UN is the victim or the originator of 
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an internationally wrongful act. Where the force is the victim of a 
violation of the applicable international law, the UN may claim damages 
as a result. When a member of the force suffers damage the organization 
may exercise its right of “function protection”. On the other hand, if 
members of the force, acting in their official capacity, violate rules of 
international law, the United Nations must correct this wrong by paying 
damages, securing the punishment of the culprit, expressing regret or 
offering excuses. 
The UN is bound by general international law including the application of 
the law of war, and there is no exception. This was recognized by the 
Secretary-General in UNFICYP, after some hesitation and refusal. So, the 
UN force shall respect the principles and spirit of the general 
international conventions applicable to the conduct of the basic content of 
international treaties relating to the law of war which constitutes 
customary law and international humanitarian law as was emphasized by 
the Secretary-General in a Bulletin “the fundamental humanitarian law 
are applicable to United Nations in institutions of armed conflict…”. 
Some writers argue that the law of war cannot be applied to the UN 
forces, because UN peace-keeping forces are soldiers without enemies 
and they are different from belligerent forces. The UN may rely on 
regional organizations for peace-keeping purposes, as is provided by 
Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations to maintain 
international peace and security. The mandate of these forces includes the 
right to use ‘all necessary means’ including the use of force, to achieve 
the goals of the mandate. These forces are, thus, to be distinguished from 
peace-keeping forces, as they do not depend on the consent of the parties 
effected by their activities and may take the initiative to use force.  
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(i) The Relation of UN Peace-Keeping and Chapter VII  
The UN peace-keeping in Kosovo 1999 (UNMIK) and in East Timor 
(UNTAET) were created under Chapter VII. The mandate of UNMIK in 
Kosovo was to promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and 
self-government in Kosovo perform basic civilian administration 
functions, organize the development of provisional institutions for 
democratic and autonomous self-government, facilitate a political process 
designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, support the reconstruction 
of key infrastructure, support humanitarian aid, and maintain civil law 
and order, including establishing local police forces.  
The invocation of Chapter VII was to authorize force by member states; 
legitimize the very wide powers of UNMIK to restore a semblance of 
normal life to the province; and to carry out the operations without 
consent of Yugoslavia. 
UNTAET in East Timor was established under Chapter VII, and 
empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority. That was 
under Resolution 127271. It was authorized to take all necessary measures 
to fulfill its mandate. There was no reference to Indonesian consent.  
The first peace-keeping force established in Africa under Chapter VII was 
in Liberia in 2003. Under Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003) 
UNMIL was set up with political, military, civilian police, criminal 
justice, civil affairs human rights, gender, child protection, disarmament, 
demobilization, reintegration, and public information and support 
components. The military component was to create a secure and stable 
environment throughout Liberia after the recent civil war and the 
prolonged instability.  
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In the Sudan after Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 2005, the UN 
established peace-keeping forces UNMIS with the mandate to monitor 
peace agreement and its implementation. 
Unlike traditional theory, UN peace-keeping forces under Chapter VII, do 
not require the consent of the host state. Moreover, traditional peace-
keeping forces were limited to use force in self-defence only. However, 
the right to self-defence extends to the right to resist attempts by forceful 
means to prevent the force from discharging its duties under its 
mandate72.    
(ii) The Brahimi Report 
The Security Council made a declaration on ensuring an effective role for 
the maintenance of international peace and security, particularly in 
Africa. The Brahimi (special envoy of the Secretary General) Report has 
had a great influence on the practical and administrative reform of UN 
peace-keeping forces, in the following matters: peace-keeping is the 
responsibility of all Member States, first and foremost of Members of the 
Security Council;  there should be relationship between the Security 
Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries on the basis that 
this would help to address such problems as commitment gaps in the 
contribution of troops or shortcoming in the operations. So, there should 
be an improvement in the consultation process, in order to foster a 
common understanding of the situation on the ground of the mission’s 
mandate and of its implementation; and there should be well-conceived 
and clearly defined peace-keeping mandates. The Report affirmed the 
concept of “robust peace-keeping” but this was not accepted by those 
who support a more limited concept of peace-keeping principles of 
importability, consent and self-defence. The call for bigger forces, better 
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equipped and more costly, able to pose a credible deterrent, contrast with 
the traditional non-threatening presence that characterized traditional 
peace-keeping.          
The Brahimi Report recommended that the Security Council adopt only 
clear, credible and achievable mandates for peace-keeping forces. The 
Report made four specific recommendations:  
First, before the Security Council agrees to implement a cease-fire or 
peace agreement with a UN-led peace-keeping operations, the Council 
assure itself that the agreement meets conditions such as consistency with 
international human rights standards and practicability of the specified 
tasks and time lines.  
Second, the Security Council should leave in a draft form resolutions 
authorizing missions with sizable troop levels until such time as the 
Secretary General has firm commitments of troops and other critical 
mission support elements from Member states.  
Third, Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of 
peace-keeping operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous 
situations, especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of 
effort,  
Fourth, the Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to 
know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission 
mandate73. 
After Brahimi Report, a new doctrine of peace-keeping was created in the 
Security Council Resolution 1327 (2000), the Council resolved to give 
peace-keeping operations clear, credible and achievable mandate. It 
undertook to ensure that the mandate tasks of peace keeping operations 
were appropriate to the situation on the ground, taking account of such 
factors as the prospects of success, the potential need to protect civilians 
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and the possibility that some parties may seek to undermine peace 
through violence. It also emphasized that the rules of engagement of UN 
peace-keeping forces should be fully consistent with the legal basis of the 
operation and with any clearly set out the circumstances in which force 
may be used to protect all mission components and personnel74.  
(iii) Relations between the United Nations, and contributing states and 
host states 
The relations between the United Nations and contributing states has to 
be regulated by an agreement. The effect of the agreement is to place the 
national contingent at the disposal of the UN. But, the contributing state 
retains certain powers over the members of the forces, in particular 
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction. So, the function of the agreements 
and accords between the UN and the participating states is to create an 
international legal obligation of the states to ensure that the required legal 
result is indeed achieved.  
The presence of a force or observer group is not imposed upon a host 
state by unilateral binding decision of the UN. The basis of their presence 
in the host state can only be by an agreement. There are two levels of the 
agreement. Firstly, the agreement relating to the tasks or functions of the 
observer group or the peace- keeping force. This is when the host state 
accepts the relevant resolution of the UN.  
Secondly, the agreement concerning the status of the observer group or 
forces as such and their individual members, in particular the privilege 
and immunities. In the absence of such agreement the status of observer 
group or a peace- keeping force is governed by general rules, in particular 
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General Assembly Resolution 57/129; General Assembly Resolution 57/336, Security Council 
Resolutions 1318, 1327, 1363 – UN Press Release GA/PK/178.:20. Gray Peace Keeping After the 
Brahimi Report: is there a crisis of credibility for the UN. 6 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 
(2001) 267, Gray Supra, 16. p. 243.  
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there are three categories: First, the general rules of international law 
applicable to the conduct of military units, second, the conclusion drawn 
from those agreements which form the basis for the presence of forces, 
and third the general Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations, which reads: “the force and its personnel should be 
granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations”.  
Another convention dealing with problems of peace-keeping is the 
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel75. 
It regulates a matter which cannot be addressed by normal status 
agreements, namely transit through third states. It deals with status of 
peace-keeping operation and including a duty to prosecute attacks against 
such personnel76. The first problem to be dealt with by a status-of-forces 
agreement is the delimitation between the spheres of jurisdiction of the 
host state and the UN. As a general principle, the sovereignty of the state 
is to be respected. This means that all members of the unit have to respect 
the law of the host state77.  The host state recognizes the jurisdiction of 
the UN over its organs. Thus, the relations between the UN and the 
members of force are not subject to the law of the host state.  
The UN and the Members of the force are exempt from the criminal and 
civil jurisdiction of the host state. As a general principle, the sovereignty 
of the territorial state is to be respected. On the other hand, the host state 
recognizes the jurisdiction of the UN over its organs.  
So, the relations between UN and the Members of the force are not 
subject to the law of host state. Basic limitations on the application and 
enforcement of the order of the host state derive from the right of the UN 
                                           
75 General Assembly, Resolution, 49/59 of December 09.1999. Bloom. E. T. Protecting peace-keeping: 
the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel: AJIL. 89 (1995), pp. 621-
31.  
76 Articles 5, 7 – 18 of the Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel.  
77 Articles 6 of Convention on the Safely of UN and Associated Personnel.  
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to exercise its function. This right of the organization to carry out its 
mission and the corresponding duty of a host state not to hinder, but 
rather to support it in doing so. The major element of this principle is the 
right to freedom of movement. In this connection, the freedom of 
communication and the right to use arms to the extent permitted by the 
mandate enjoyed by forces must also be mentioned78. The host state has 
also to put at the disposal of the UN the necessary premises and 
buildings, commodities and services for the force including labor, public 
utilities and local currency.  
A further problem is the compensation for damage suffered either by the 
host state or its inhabitant or by the United Nations or member pf the 
force. As the host state does not possess jurisdiction over claims of this 
nature except claims based on private acts of members of the force, there 
must be provisions for a procedure for how such claims should be 
handled. In some cases there was a mixed commission between the host 
state and the UN. In other cases, the UN has set up claims commissions in 
order to deal with damages caused by the force or its members. However, 
Simma, doubts whether the actual practice provides sufficient guarantees 
of legal protection for individuals affected by the activities of peace-
keeping forces.  
The new Model Status of Force Agreement contains more satisfactory 
provision in this respect. The status-of-force agreement mentions the 
question of the security of the force and its members only in passing.  
The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel, provides for a duty of the host state to ensure the safety of 
personnel, a duty of states to enact criminal legislation making serious 
attacks against the personnel a crime, a duty to establish jurisdiction 
enabling states to prosecute and punish such crimes, as well as a duty to 
                                           
78 Bruno Simma, Supra, p. 694.  
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prosecute or to extradite offenders79.  These provisions are supplemented 
by Article 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court making 
attacks against peace-keepers a war crime80.     
(iv) Financing for the Peace-Keeping Forces  
Financial problems are more significant for peace-keeping forces than 
they are for observer groups in view of the size of the operations. For the 
peace-keeping forces, the distribution of financial burdens is between the 
United Nations and the States providing contingents. The responsibility 
of the contributing state is to pay the members of the contingent and 
furnishes all equipment. Other costs are borne by the UN, such as 
transportation of contingent from the home state to the place of operation 
and reimbursement of salaries and equipments.  
5- Conclusion  
The Charter of the United Nations does not expressly provide for the 
establishment of the peace-keeping forces or observer groups. So, it can 
only be established by the Security Council or General Assembly. Unlike 
traditional peace-keeping force, which depends on the consent of the 
parties, impartiality and the use of force only in case of self-defence, the 
contemporaneous peace-keeping theory protecting humanitarian during 
continuing warfare, protecting civilian populations in safe areas, maintain 
civil law and order, establishing local police forces and to use force to 
achieve the above purpose. So, the peace-keeping under Chapter VII does 
not require the consent of the state against which these procedures are 
taken.  
                                           
79 Articles, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15 of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel.  
80 Article, 8, of the Statute if the International Criminal Court.  
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The power to establish peace-keeping forces was first raised by the 
International Court of Justice in the Expense case (1962). In that case the 
Court found that the Security Council has implied power to establish UN 
peace-keeping forces and it has the competence to delegate to the 
Secretary-General the power to establish peace-keeping forces. The 
Secretary-General has stressed the basic principles for the application of 
UN peace-keeping forces. These are consent of the parties, impartiality 
and non-use of force except in self-defence. Moreover, the protection of 
humanitarian operations during continuing warfare, the protection of the 
civilian populations is safe area and pressing the parties to achieve 
national reconciliation.  
The experience of UN peace-keeping forces in Kosovo (UNMIK) and in 
East Timor (UNTAET), were established under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. The invocation of Chapter VII is to authorize force by member 
states, to legitimize the very wide powers of the force and the operations 
without consent of Yugoslavia or Indonesia Government. So, the Security 
Council under Chapter VII can order enforcement measures or authorize 
the use of force to maintain international peace and security or any other 
purpose in its mandate.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
The aim of any collective security system is to preserve, and ensure the 
observance of certain community defined values. The determination of 
what are these community values in the case of the United Nations – what 
constitutes a threat to, or breach of, international peace and security – and 
what is appropriate measure to maintain or restore peace has been left to 
the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. The justification 
to grant such broad powers to Security Council was a reaction of failure 
of the League of Nations to preserve peace and security among 
international community. It was envisaged that in determining and 
enforcing community values the designated institutional competence of 
the Council would be such that any action taken would, in general terms, 
be directed primarily at the attainment of the interests of the internal state 
actors. So, the Security Council has to determine the situation and then 
decide what appropriate measures it can resort to.  
These measures may include provisional measure to prevent an 
aggravation of the situation, measures not involving the use of armed 
forces such as complete or partial interruption of economic relations and 
of rail, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication 
and the severance of diplomatic relations and the measure involving the 
use of force, if the above measures are considered by the Security 
Council to be inadequate. It may include action by air, sea or land forces 
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. The situation endangering international peace and security 
includes acts of aggression, civil war, violations of human rights and 
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humanitarian law or any other acts that Security Council considers threat 
to peace, breach of the peace or acts of aggression.  
The Member States of the UN undertake to assist the Security Council to 
implement any of the above measures whenever it decides so. They are 
under duty to prepare armed forces, to accord relief and rights of passage. 
However, the main problem facing the Security Council is how to get 
armed forces ready and enough to render any threat or breach of 
international peace and security. For the contributing states are reluctant 
to contribute UN armed forces unless they reach agreement on how these 
forces are to be conducted. The contributing states retain certain powers 
over the members of the forces, such as criminal and disciplinary 
jurisdiction. Also, the host state should give its consent to the presence of 
some forces, e.g. observer groups and peace-keeping forces. Moreover, 
financial problems are more significant for the UN forces. The 
distribution of financial burdens between the UN and states providing 
contingents and some other donor states is a problem.  
The absence of a UN standing army renders UN to respond to the threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace or acts of aggression. So, the UN resorts 
to authorizing Chapter VII power to Member states to implement 
economic measures, or to use force under UN command (Korea) or to use 
force against aggressor states (Iraq and Kuwait). It has also used Chapter 
VII to authorize peace-keeping forces for humanitarian purposes 
(Yugoslavia and Somalia).  
From the above conclusions and in order to give the Security Council 
effective role for the maintenance of international peace and security, it is 
recommended that there should be UN standing army which should 
comprise, firstly, the enforcement forces. The basic function is to respond 
to any threat to peace, breach of international peace or acts of aggression. 
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Threat to the peace and breach of the peace include not only disputes 
between states but also crimes against humanitarian law, namely, crime 
of genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; and other violations of 
the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts within the territory of 
a state.  
The use of the enforcement forces should be under Chapter VII only. In 
this case, there is no need for the consent of targetted state. The use of 
force should be resorted to if the Security Council so decides under 
Article 42 of the Chapter VII of the Charter.  
Second, peace-keeping forces can only be established when there is peace 
agreement as emphasized in the Brahimi Report on the reform of the UN 
peace-keeping. The Report assures firstly, that the implementation of the 
UN peace-keeping is the responsibility of all member state, especially the 
members of the Security Council. The performance of the UN peace-
keeping would not improve until member states, and particularly those 
possessing the greatest capacity and means to do so, were ready to 
participate. However, the Security Council Resolution 1327 (2000), 
reflects the lack of unanimity among states as to the need for greater 
permanent members participation in UN peace-keeping. The resolution 
seems to accept that the shared responsibility could take the form of 
logistical support or provision of equipment. Developed states apparently 
advocate a division of labour; in complex and dangerous operations, 
especially those in Africa, developing states will provide troops and 
developed states will provide financial and logistical support.  
The report called for a new three-way relationship between the Security 
Council, the Secretariat and troop contributing countries on the basis that 
this would help to address such problems as commitment gaps in the 
contribution of troops or shortcomings in the operations. The Report 
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suggests improvement in the consultation process. The Security Council 
in Resolution 1327 agreed to strengthen the existing system of 
consultations, in particular during the implementation phase of an 
operation, or when considering a change in operation, or when a rapid 
deterioration on the ground threatens the peace and safety of UN 
peacekeepers.  
Another point the Report stresses is that there should be well-conceived 
and clearly defined peacekeeping mandates. This clearly raises 
fundamental question about the nature of peacekeeping. The Brahimi 
Report made a case for “robust peacekeeping” but this was not acceptable 
to those who support a more limited concept of peacekeeping, based on 
the traditional principles of impartiality, consent and self-defence. The 
call for bigger forces, better equipped and more costly, able to pose a 
credible deterrent, contrasts with the traditional non-threatening presence 
that has characterized traditional peacekeeping.  
The Brahimi Report recommended that the Security Council should not 
only adopt clear, credible and achievable mandates for peacekeeping 
forces, but also must assure that the agreement for implementation of 
peacekeeping forces meets condition of international human rights, and 
the requirement for peacekeeping operations, such as clear chain of 
command and unity of effort. Moreover, the Secretary-General must keep 
to report to the SC about the situation of the peacekeeping forces and 
when formulating or changing mission mandate. 
The Security Council should turn to regional organization to share burden 
for peacekeeping forces, such as to secure adequate number of troops and 
share financial costs. The Secretary General in his 1991 Agenda for peace 
had argued that regional organization possessed a potential that should 
utilized for preventive diplomacy , peacekeeping , peacemaking, and 
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post-conflict peace-building. The Security Council would keep its 
primary role in the maintenance of international peace and security, but 
regional action, as a matter of decentralization, delegation, and 
cooperation with UN efforts could not only lighten the burden of the 
Council, but also contribute to deeper sense of the participation, 
consensus and democratization in international affairs. He explained how 
these might be achieved. First, consultation between the UN and regional 
arrangement could help to build international consensus on the nature of 
the problem and the measures required to address it. Second, 
complementary efforts by regional organization and the UN in joint 
undertakings would encourage states outside the region to act 
supportively. Thirds, if the SC were to choose to authorize a regional 
arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within 
its region, it could lend the weight of the UN in the validity of the 
regional effort.81              
                                           
81  Gray, Peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report: Is there a Crisis of Credibility for the UN? 6 Journal 
of Conflict and Security Law (2001) 267. UN Press Release GA/SPD/200,9 of November 2000.  
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